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PRESS LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY. Edited by Phina Lahav. New York, N.Y. and London, England:
Longman, 1985, 366 pp.
This volume presents meticulously annotated studies of the press law in
three groups of democracies: (1) the Anglo-American (the United States
and the United Kingdom); (2) the Continental (France, Sweden and the
Federal Republic of Germany); and (3) the non-Western (Israel and Japan). This research project was supported by the Modern Media Institute
of St. Petersburg, Florida, and is introduced by Yale Emeritus Professor
Thomas I. Emerson. Of the seven scholars chosen to survey the press law of
his or her own country, six are law professors and the seventh is an English
Middle Temple barrister. Each of these contributors assesses the extent to
which his respective country's historical experience and cultural heritage,
and present form of government and legal system affect a shared commitment to freedom of the press.
The editor, Phina Lahav, required that the essay devoted to each country be uniformly structured in order to facilitate comparative inquiry.
Within the general body of press law the contributors discuss similar topics
such as prior restraint, national security, internal order, public morality,
free press and fair trial, reporters' privilege, right of reply, and the protection of reputation and privacy. The essays contain random cross references,
but what they essentially provide is a wealth of material upon which the
reader may base his own comparative analyses, or upon which a practitioner might base the type of comparative law brief Louis Brandeis pioneered in the case of Muller v. Oregon.' For example, Aviam Soifer asserts
in his chapter on the United States that the American press is unusually,
"perhaps uniquely, forceful and untrammeled." Editor Lahav agrees, citing,
as a good illustration, the American law of defamation which "is unique in
the protection it gives false statements about the public conduct of governmental officials, as long as those statements are not published with actual
knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth," according to the rule announced in the 1964 decision of New York Times v. Sullivan.2 Relevant
passages from the essays on the press law of the other six countries bear out
Lahav's assertion.

1. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
in footnote 1, an abstract of Brandeis' brief
France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Holland
419-420.
2. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.

Justice Brewer's opinion for the Court carries,
citing relevant statutes from Great Britain,
and many states of the United States. Id., at
274, 279-280 (1964).
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In his opinion in the 1968 case of Slim v. Daily Telegraph,' Diplock,
L.J., described the tort of libel in the United Kingdom as "artificial and
archaic" and "beyond redemption by the Courts." The "Faulks" Committee on Defamation which was established soon thereafter, however, issued a
report in 1975 which rejected a recommendation of the enactment of the
U.S. rule relating to public officials as set out in New York Times v.
Sullivan.
Lahav notes that "other legal systems, such as the French, actually
prefer the interest of the state in the reputation of its officials over liberal
justifications." The French Law of the Press,' passed in 1881, recognizes in
article 12 the right of public officials to be protected from threats, insults,
abuse or defamation made against them in the course of their duties. Articles 30-33 impose a special penalty on anyone who defames a public official
acting in his official capacity or who defames or insults an administrative or
elective body.
German Basic Law article 5, section 2,1 states expressly that the guarantees of free expression and communication listed in section 1 are "subject
to. . .the right not to be defamed and slandered." More specifically, German Criminal Code section 90 prohibits the defamation of federal and state
officials and institutions. In practice this protection has been virtually unused perhaps to some extent because of the Code's imposition of a burden
of proof that a defendant "intentionally furthered activity directed against
the existence of the Federal Republic and her basic Constitutional rules."
This requirement bears some resemblance to the judicially created obligation of proving "actual malice" (i.e., knowing or reckless disregard of the
truth) which must be met by public officials-and public figures-who
bring defamation actions or for whom such actions are brought in the
United States.
Writing on Sweden's practice, Hakan Stromberg concludes that, as a
practical matter, the only type of prohibited expression in that country that
is of any real significance is defamation. In Sweden a post-1960 wave of
liberalization deprived the King, the Riksdag, public officers, foreign heads
of state, and diplomats of special protection and placed them on an equal
footing with private persons with regard to defamation.
In the case of Ha'aretz v. Electric Company, the Israeli Supreme

3. Slim v. Daily Telegraph, [1968] 2 Q.B. 157, 179.
4. French Law of the Press of July 29, 1881, as subsequently expanded and amended.
5. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 5 (W. Ger. 1949, amended 1968). The Basic Law is to govern the FRG until unification occurs. At such time the Grundgesetz will be superceded by a
Constitution approved by the people of a unified German state. Hobson, The European Community and East-West German Relations, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 45 (1978).
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Court rejected the rule of New York Times v. Sullivan preferring the English approach based on the belief that the extra exposure of public officials
to press criticism would, in the words of Judge Landau, "tend to deter sensitive and honorable men from seeking public positions of trust and responsibility and leave them open to others who have no respect for their reputation." The Supreme Court opinion also noted that the unrestrained
defamation of the leaders of the Weimar Republic helped to pave the way
for the rise of Nazism in Germany." The Israeli Penal Law provides penalties for a person who "by gesture, words or acts insults a public servant. . .whilst engaged in the discharge of his duties .
Like the U.S. Constitution, article 15 of the Japanese Constitution9 has
been interpreted as providing justification for less protection for the reputation of public officials than for that of others. Japanese Criminal Code article 230 codifies this distinction but only to the extent of making truth a
defense for those who defame public officials and public figures but not
necessarily for those who defame others.'
Professor Soifer tells us that "since the 1925 dictum in Gitlow v. New
York, state judges, legislatures, and officials may not interpret their state
constitutional provisions more narrowly than the United States Constitution's First Amendment, as construed by the United States Supreme
Court."(p. xx) Soifer glosses over the fact that the First Amendment is a
limitation on the powers of Congress, and not on those of the states and
over the fact that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a
procedural and not a substantive limitation on state power. It is to his
credit, however, that he does seed his text with hints that First Amendment
jurisprudence concerning substantive state legislation dealing with expression may be without foundation in the text or historical genesis of those
amendments to the federal Constitution. For example, he cites "the tendency of Americans to invoke First Amendment rights in ways that are
partially mythic and mostly symbolic" (p. 80) and which romanticize their
origins. He states that "if it is impossible to provide an entirely coherent
theory of freedom of expression to cover all the hard cases, it is also difficult
to refute the Court's recent claim that First Amendment values are 'transcendent imperatives.' "(p. 82)" Professor Soifer explains that although

6. Ha'aretz v. Electric Co., 32(3)P.D. 337, 345-46 (1978).
7. Id., at 346-47.
8. Israeli Penal Law, 5737-1977, at § 288 L.S.I. (Special Volume) 79 (1977). The author
of this chapter did not, however, come across any prosecutions under § 288.
9. KENP6 (Constitution) art. XV (Japan).
10. KEIH6 (Penal Code), L.N. 45 of 1907, art. 230.
I1. Cited in Board of Education, Island Trees v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 865 (1982) (Brennan J., plurality opinion).
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there is no definitive source or reliable grundnorm for the legal theory supporting such values, a widely-held utopian dream of an unfettered press, a
web of theoretical claims and powerful rhetoric have resulted in a growing
network of precedents which have provided "a'gloss on freedom of expression that simultaneously confirms, and creates a part of the American tradition. . .a tradition transcending specific cases and events."(p. 83) [Emphases added.]
In a concluding chapter, the editor briefly recalls the transitions of the
press in different lands from its early negative status, burdened by licensing
and censorship, to one of equal treatment. He also takes note of current
demands by some for a privileged press status marked by a reporter's privilege and special rights of access. Lahav also defines recurring or continuing
tensions variously characterized as being between freedom of the press and
certain other societal interests, between absolute freedom and the rule of
law, between universal liberal values and the state, between libertarian/
constitutional theory and the authoritarian/instrumental theory, between
press and state authoritarianism, and between the press as a political organ
and the press as an objective medium. The editor's review and comparison
of the preceding accounts of press law developments in countries with a
written constitution and without one (as in the United Kingdom and Israel)
and in countries with a comprehensive press statute and without one (as in
the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan) dramatically illustrates
Judge Learned Hand's contention that
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no
constitution, no law, no court can save it. . .or even do much to help
12
it.
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